The overall goal for the Quality and Safety Education for Nurses (QSEN) project is to meet the challenge of preparing future nurses who will have the.Guide to the Care and Use of Experimental Animals Volume 1, 2nd Edition Canadian Council on Animal Care Conseil canadien de protection des animaux. Site examining the hypothesis that we are currently living in an "ancestor simulation" run by a future, post-human society. Includes papers and research links. From the design of new aircraft to the support of its jetliners in operation, Airbus develops and utilises a full range of simulation and test tools that benefit from. Philosophy of Dreaming. According to Owen Flanagan (2000), there are four major philosophical questions about dreaming: 1. How can I be sure I am not always dreaming? Empathy and Sympathy in Ethics. The distinction between “empathy” and “sympathy” in the context of ethics is a dynamic and challenging one. The eighteenth century texts of David Hume and Adam Smith used the word . After discussing the early uses of these terms, this article is organized historically. Two traditions are distinguished. The first is the Anglo- American tradition, and it extends from Hume and Smith to the twenty- first century work of Michael Slote. Stephen Darwall’s contribution is applied in engaging Hume and Smith. Finally, the interrelation of empathy, sympathy and altruism is explored in the work of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. It extends from the spirituality of Johann Herder to the phenomenological movement of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein. The intentional analysis of empathy is directly relevant to the constitution of the social community in a broad, normative relationship with the . The choice of which philosophers and thinkers to include is also determined by the contingent facts that those chosen are most likely to be encountered in contemporary debates about empathy, sympathy, and ethics. ![]() Stein, Husserl, and Heidegger are primarily epistemological, ontological, and post- onto- theological, and are in the background of any contemporary, formal engagement with ethical theories, which is the focus of the present article. Scheler turns his phenomenological intuition of essence (wesenschau) towards the moral sentiments; and his analysis of the diversity of sympathetic forms is a lasting contribution to the topic. Contemporary Continental thinkers such as Larry Hatab and Frederick Olafson associate empathy with Heideggerian Mitsein and Mitdasein (being in the world with others) as the existential foundation of ethics). The roles of Friedrich Nietzsche, the Holocaust, and the . The article ends with a discussion of how the discipline of psychoanalysis contributes to the role of empathy. Table of Contents. Introduction. An Example and a Working Definition. The Anglo- American Tradition. Hume’s Many Meanings of “Sympathy”Adam Smith’s Philosophy of Sympathy. Contractualism and Sympathy in Rawls. Nagel’s Incomplete Version of Empathy. Empathy as a Moral Criterion in Slote’s Ethics of Caring. The Continental Tradition. Nietzsche’s Empathy of Smell Complements His Suspicion. The Challenge to Empathy of the Event of the Holocaust. Ethics Against Empathy in Levinas. Empathy in the Context of Psychoanalysis and Ethics. A Common Root of Empathy and Ethics. References and Further Reading. Introduction. The words “sympathy” and “empathy” can be distinguished in several ways. Some of these distinctions are controversial, and work is needed to make them more precise. For example, “sympathy” is frequently used to mean one person’s response to the negative affects (suffering) of another individual, leading to pro- social (helping) behavior towards the other. In contrast, “empathy” generally includes responding to positive affects as well as negative ones without, however, necessarily requiring doing anything about it (no pro- social behavior required). A single mention in Aristotle in the original Greek of empathes occurs in Aristotle’s On Dreams in which the coward experiences intense fear upon imagining that he sees his enemy approaching. In the original Greek, the references to empathes are few and marginal, generally meaning “in a state of intense emotion,” “passionate emotion,” or “much affected by,” a distinctly different meaning than it has today. The short list of other occurrences in antiquity is filled out by a single reference each in Plutarch’s Lives, in Flavius Jospheus Antiquitates Judaica, and Polybius Histories (entry on empathes in Liddell and Scott 1. In contrast, the number of references to “sympathy” is hundreds of entries long and is diverse, extending from Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Aristotle, Demosthenes, and frequently breaking though to the English in Shakespeare. The meanings include the constellation of ones that we would recognize including “agreement,” “pity,” “compassion,” “transmission of affect,” and “suggestibility.”In the English language “empathy” simply did not exist prior to Cornell University psychologist Edward Bradford Titchner’s neologism in translating the German word “Einf. Titchener (1. 90. Arguably the German is best captured by a phrase such as “feeling one’s way into,” but the advantages of a single word also have merit. Thus, it is technically an error, but one with an underlying kernel of truth, when one of the foremost researchers on empathy uses “empathy” as a substitute for “sympathy” as in the following from Hoffman: “And the British version of utilitarianism represented by David Hume, Adam Smith, and others for whom empathy was a necessary social bond, finds expression in current research on empathy, compassion, and the morality of caring” (2. As noted, the word “empathy” did not exist in the English language when Hume (1. Smith (1. 75. 9) write about engaging the foundations of morality in “sympathy,” the latter being the only word they used. Yet Hoffman captures an aspect of the truth as the word “sympathy” itself as used by Hume and Smith included the communicability of affect and emotional contagion, which today we would also count as inputs to “empathy” without, however, reducing empathy to emotional contagion and low level transmission of affect without remainder. Prior to the arrival of the word “empathy” into the English language, “sympathy” captured the distinction “communicability of affect,” onto which additional meanings were layered. Hume and Smith are the main witnesses to this development. With the arrival of the word “empathy,” the difference between a method of data gathering about the experiences (sensations, affects, emotions) of other individuals and the use of this experience for ethically relevant processing, decision making, and evaluations was able to moved into the foreground. Meanwhile, the Continental tradition reenacts in its own terms some of the same challenges in the German language that occurred around “sympathy” in the British tradition. Starting with Herder (1. Forster 2. 01. 0: 1. Husserl, Scheler, and Stein a group of terms around “f. Thus: “mitf. All these semantic distinctions emerged alongside “einf. Wilhelm Dilthey dismissed Einf. However, the point where these two traditions intersect is precise. The German psychologist Theodor Lipps translated Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature into German (1. Hume/Lipps) even as Lipps was completing his own Aesthetik (1. Lipps eventually published the translation of Hume in two volumes in 1. Without directly borrowing what Hume said about “sympathy,” Lipps made empathy (Einf. While “sympathy” comes across into German as “sympathie,” the seed was planted for the close connection between sympathy and (aesthetic) taste that developed into an entire aesthetic (Lipps 1. Einf. An entire generation of thinkers, including Freud, Husserl, and Heidegger, was inhibited from using the precise term “empathy” . Further more, when they did use it in the context of overcoming otherness, they marginalized it. This was because they were reluctant to invoke echoes of Lipps’ psychology of beauty and art – as well as Lipps’s solipsistic reveries that the individual psyche is what animates and enlivens nature and other individual through projective empathy. Scheler got it accurate dismissing Lipps’ “projective empathy”. One of the innovations in the use of “empathy” in the 1. Heinz Kohut (1. 95. Goldberg 1. 99. 9). Kohut’s use is based on his view of philosophy of science (see the Hartmann- Nagel debate (Hartmann, 1. E. Nagel 1. 95. 9)) rather than in any usage in Freud, who mostly neglected the word but not the underlying distinction (Trosman & Simmons 1. Freud 1. 90. 9 where Einf. Kohut’s use of “empathy” is a method of data gathering oriented towards a listening- based immersion in the affective, experiential, and mental life of the other person. However, even in a relatively value neutral inquiry such as psychoanalysis, the use of empathy as a method of data gathering has turned out to be relevant to ethics. Issues arise around the coherence and integrity of character and the self as a bulwark against unethical behavior such as rampant cheating, drug abuse, gambling, moral malaise and other individual, social, and communal ills. An Example and a Working Definition. In the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 1. Priest and the Levite cross the road and pass by the Jewish traveler who was robbed, beaten by thieves, and left for dead. The Samaritan (today that would be a local inhabitant, a Palestinian) stops to help the individual in need. Multiple, overlapping descriptions are available of the Samaritan as a would- be moral agent. For example: The Samaritan’s altruism was aroused. His sympathy was aroused. His empathy was aroused. In the case of those who crossed the road and passed by the victim without stopping, the experience of empathic distress was decisive (arguably). They experienced the other’s suffering and were overwhelmed by it. They handled the empathic experience of suffering by avoiding the situation. In the case of the Samaritan, the empathic distress was transformed into sympathetic distress (under one description (Hoffman 2. An entirely different description is available: ethics is fundamental in attributing the altruistic decision from the start to a fundamental recognition on the part of the Samaritan, answering the question, “Who is my neighbor?” The answer? By the end of this article, we shall not necessarily know which description is the truth with a capital “T,” but we shall have determined the terms of the debate and defined the issues in detail. A working definition of “empathy” will be useful.
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